route/vendor/github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/handshake/crypto_setup_server_test.go

760 lines
28 KiB
Go

package handshake
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"io"
"net"
"time"
"github.com/bifurcation/mint"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/crypto"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/mocks/crypto"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/protocol"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/internal/utils"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go/qerr"
. "github.com/onsi/ginkgo"
. "github.com/onsi/gomega"
)
type mockKEX struct {
ephermal bool
sharedKeyError error
}
func (m *mockKEX) PublicKey() []byte {
if m.ephermal {
return []byte("ephermal pub")
}
return []byte("initial public")
}
func (m *mockKEX) CalculateSharedKey(otherPublic []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if m.sharedKeyError != nil {
return nil, m.sharedKeyError
}
if m.ephermal {
return []byte("shared ephermal"), nil
}
return []byte("shared key"), nil
}
type mockSigner struct {
gotCHLO bool
}
func (s *mockSigner) SignServerProof(sni string, chlo []byte, serverConfigData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(chlo) > 0 {
s.gotCHLO = true
}
return []byte("proof"), nil
}
func (*mockSigner) GetCertsCompressed(sni string, common, cached []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return []byte("certcompressed"), nil
}
func (*mockSigner) GetLeafCert(sni string) ([]byte, error) {
return []byte("certuncompressed"), nil
}
func mockQuicCryptoKeyDerivation(forwardSecure bool, sharedSecret, nonces []byte, connID protocol.ConnectionID, chlo []byte, scfg []byte, cert []byte, divNonce []byte, pers protocol.Perspective) (crypto.AEAD, error) {
return mockcrypto.NewMockAEAD(mockCtrl), nil
}
type mockStream struct {
unblockRead chan struct{}
dataToRead bytes.Buffer
dataWritten bytes.Buffer
}
var _ io.ReadWriter = &mockStream{}
var errMockStreamClosing = errors.New("mock stream closing")
func newMockStream() *mockStream {
return &mockStream{unblockRead: make(chan struct{})}
}
// call Close to make Read return
func (s *mockStream) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, _ := s.dataToRead.Read(p)
if n == 0 { // block if there's no data
<-s.unblockRead
return 0, errMockStreamClosing
}
return n, nil // never return an EOF
}
func (s *mockStream) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return s.dataWritten.Write(p)
}
func (s *mockStream) close() {
close(s.unblockRead)
}
type mockCookieProtector struct {
data []byte
decodeErr error
}
var _ mint.CookieProtector = &mockCookieProtector{}
func (mockCookieProtector) NewToken(sourceAddr []byte) ([]byte, error) {
return append([]byte("token "), sourceAddr...), nil
}
func (s mockCookieProtector) DecodeToken(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s.decodeErr != nil {
return nil, s.decodeErr
}
if len(data) < 6 {
return nil, errors.New("token too short")
}
return data[6:], nil
}
var _ = Describe("Server Crypto Setup", func() {
var (
kex *mockKEX
signer *mockSigner
scfg *ServerConfig
cs *cryptoSetupServer
stream *mockStream
paramsChan chan TransportParameters
handshakeEvent chan struct{}
nonce32 []byte
versionTag []byte
validSTK []byte
aead []byte
kexs []byte
version protocol.VersionNumber
supportedVersions []protocol.VersionNumber
sourceAddrValid bool
)
const (
expectedInitialNonceLen = 32
expectedFSNonceLen = 64
)
BeforeEach(func() {
var err error
remoteAddr := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.IPv4(1, 2, 3, 4), Port: 1234}
// use a buffered channel here, so that we can parse a CHLO without having to receive the TransportParameters to avoid blocking
paramsChan = make(chan TransportParameters, 1)
handshakeEvent = make(chan struct{}, 2)
stream = newMockStream()
kex = &mockKEX{}
signer = &mockSigner{}
scfg, err = NewServerConfig(kex, signer)
nonce32 = make([]byte, 32)
aead = []byte("AESG")
kexs = []byte("C255")
copy(nonce32[4:12], scfg.obit) // set the OBIT value at the right position
versionTag = make([]byte, 4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(versionTag, uint32(protocol.VersionWhatever))
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
version = protocol.SupportedVersions[len(protocol.SupportedVersions)-1]
supportedVersions = []protocol.VersionNumber{version, 98, 99}
csInt, err := NewCryptoSetup(
stream,
protocol.ConnectionID(42),
remoteAddr,
version,
scfg,
&TransportParameters{IdleTimeout: protocol.DefaultIdleTimeout},
supportedVersions,
nil,
paramsChan,
handshakeEvent,
)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
cs = csInt.(*cryptoSetupServer)
cs.scfg.cookieGenerator.cookieProtector = &mockCookieProtector{}
validSTK, err = cs.scfg.cookieGenerator.NewToken(remoteAddr)
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
sourceAddrValid = true
cs.acceptSTKCallback = func(_ net.Addr, _ *Cookie) bool { return sourceAddrValid }
cs.keyDerivation = mockQuicCryptoKeyDerivation
cs.keyExchange = func() crypto.KeyExchange { return &mockKEX{ephermal: true} }
cs.nullAEAD = mockcrypto.NewMockAEAD(mockCtrl)
cs.cryptoStream = stream
})
Context("diversification nonce", func() {
BeforeEach(func() {
cs.secureAEAD = mockcrypto.NewMockAEAD(mockCtrl)
cs.receivedForwardSecurePacket = false
Expect(cs.DiversificationNonce()).To(BeEmpty())
// Div nonce is created after CHLO
cs.handleCHLO("", nil, map[Tag][]byte{TagNONC: nonce32})
})
It("returns diversification nonces", func() {
Expect(cs.DiversificationNonce()).To(HaveLen(32))
})
})
Context("when responding to client messages", func() {
var cert []byte
var xlct []byte
var fullCHLO map[Tag][]byte
BeforeEach(func() {
xlct = make([]byte, 8)
var err error
cert, err = cs.scfg.certChain.GetLeafCert("")
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(xlct, crypto.HashCert(cert))
fullCHLO = map[Tag][]byte{
TagSCID: scfg.ID,
TagSNI: []byte("quic.clemente.io"),
TagNONC: nonce32,
TagSTK: validSTK,
TagXLCT: xlct,
TagAEAD: aead,
TagKEXS: kexs,
TagPUBS: bytes.Repeat([]byte{'e'}, 31),
TagVER: versionTag,
}
})
It("doesn't support Chrome's head-of-line blocking experiment", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagFHL2: []byte("foobar"),
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(ErrHOLExperiment))
})
It("doesn't support Chrome's no STOP_WAITING experiment", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagNSTP: []byte("foobar"),
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(ErrNSTPExperiment))
})
It("reads the transport parameters sent by the client", func() {
sourceAddrValid = true
fullCHLO[TagICSL] = []byte{0x37, 0x13, 0, 0}
_, err := cs.handleMessage(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize), fullCHLO)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
var params TransportParameters
Expect(paramsChan).To(Receive(&params))
Expect(params.IdleTimeout).To(Equal(0x1337 * time.Second))
})
It("generates REJ messages", func() {
sourceAddrValid = false
response, err := cs.handleInchoateCHLO("", bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize), nil)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(response).To(HavePrefix("REJ"))
Expect(response).To(ContainSubstring("initial public"))
Expect(response).ToNot(ContainSubstring("certcompressed"))
Expect(response).ToNot(ContainSubstring("proof"))
Expect(signer.gotCHLO).To(BeFalse())
})
It("REJ messages don't include cert or proof without STK", func() {
sourceAddrValid = false
response, err := cs.handleInchoateCHLO("", bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize), nil)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(response).To(HavePrefix("REJ"))
Expect(response).ToNot(ContainSubstring("certcompressed"))
Expect(response).ToNot(ContainSubstring("proof"))
Expect(signer.gotCHLO).To(BeFalse())
})
It("REJ messages include cert and proof with valid STK", func() {
sourceAddrValid = true
response, err := cs.handleInchoateCHLO("", bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize), map[Tag][]byte{
TagSTK: validSTK,
TagSNI: []byte("foo"),
})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(response).To(HavePrefix("REJ"))
Expect(response).To(ContainSubstring("certcompressed"))
Expect(response).To(ContainSubstring("proof"))
Expect(signer.gotCHLO).To(BeTrue())
})
It("generates SHLO messages", func() {
var checkedSecure, checkedForwardSecure bool
cs.keyDerivation = func(forwardSecure bool, sharedSecret, nonces []byte, connID protocol.ConnectionID, chlo []byte, scfg []byte, cert []byte, divNonce []byte, pers protocol.Perspective) (crypto.AEAD, error) {
if forwardSecure {
Expect(nonces).To(HaveLen(expectedFSNonceLen))
checkedForwardSecure = true
Expect(sharedSecret).To(Equal([]byte("shared ephermal")))
} else {
Expect(nonces).To(HaveLen(expectedInitialNonceLen))
Expect(sharedSecret).To(Equal([]byte("shared key")))
checkedSecure = true
}
return mockcrypto.NewMockAEAD(mockCtrl), nil
}
response, err := cs.handleCHLO("", []byte("chlo-data"), map[Tag][]byte{
TagPUBS: []byte("pubs-c"),
TagNONC: nonce32,
TagAEAD: aead,
TagKEXS: kexs,
})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(response).To(HavePrefix("SHLO"))
message, err := ParseHandshakeMessage(bytes.NewReader(response))
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(message.Data).To(HaveKeyWithValue(TagPUBS, []byte("ephermal pub")))
Expect(message.Data).To(HaveKey(TagSNO))
Expect(message.Data).To(HaveKey(TagVER))
// the supported versions should include one reserved version number
Expect(message.Data[TagVER]).To(HaveLen(4*len(supportedVersions) + 4))
for _, v := range supportedVersions {
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
utils.BigEndian.WriteUint32(b, uint32(v))
Expect(message.Data[TagVER]).To(ContainSubstring(string(b.Bytes())))
}
Expect(checkedSecure).To(BeTrue())
Expect(checkedForwardSecure).To(BeTrue())
})
It("handles long handshake", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagSNI: []byte("quic.clemente.io"),
TagSTK: validSTK,
TagPAD: bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize),
TagVER: versionTag,
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(stream.dataWritten.Bytes()).To(HavePrefix("REJ"))
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(Receive()) // for the switch to secure
Expect(stream.dataWritten.Bytes()).To(ContainSubstring("SHLO"))
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(Receive()) // for the switch to forward secure
Expect(handshakeEvent).ToNot(BeClosed())
})
It("rejects client nonces that have the wrong length", func() {
fullCHLO[TagNONC] = []byte("too short client nonce")
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.InvalidCryptoMessageParameter, "invalid client nonce length")))
})
It("rejects client nonces that have the wrong OBIT value", func() {
fullCHLO[TagNONC] = make([]byte, 32) // the OBIT value is nonce[4:12] and here just initialized to 0
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.InvalidCryptoMessageParameter, "OBIT not matching")))
})
It("errors if it can't calculate a shared key", func() {
testErr := errors.New("test error")
kex.sharedKeyError = testErr
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(testErr))
})
It("handles 0-RTT handshake", func() {
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).NotTo(HaveOccurred())
Expect(stream.dataWritten.Bytes()).To(HavePrefix("SHLO"))
Expect(stream.dataWritten.Bytes()).ToNot(ContainSubstring("REJ"))
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(Receive()) // for the switch to secure
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(Receive()) // for the switch to forward secure
Expect(handshakeEvent).ToNot(BeClosed())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs missing SCID", func() {
delete(fullCHLO, TagSCID)
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs missing PUBS", func() {
delete(fullCHLO, TagPUBS)
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs with missing XLCT", func() {
delete(fullCHLO, TagXLCT)
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs with wrong length XLCT", func() {
fullCHLO[TagXLCT] = bytes.Repeat([]byte{'f'}, 7) // should be 8 bytes
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs with wrong XLCT", func() {
fullCHLO[TagXLCT] = bytes.Repeat([]byte{'f'}, 8)
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes inchoate CHLOs with an invalid STK", func() {
testErr := errors.New("STK invalid")
cs.scfg.cookieGenerator.cookieProtector.(*mockCookieProtector).decodeErr = testErr
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeTrue())
})
It("recognizes proper CHLOs", func() {
Expect(cs.isInchoateCHLO(fullCHLO, cert)).To(BeFalse())
})
It("rejects CHLOs without the version tag", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagSCID: scfg.ID,
TagSNI: []byte("quic.clemente.io"),
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.InvalidCryptoMessageParameter, "client hello missing version tag")))
})
It("rejects CHLOs with a version tag that has the wrong length", func() {
fullCHLO[TagVER] = []byte{0x13, 0x37} // should be 4 bytes
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.InvalidCryptoMessageParameter, "incorrect version tag")))
})
It("detects version downgrade attacks", func() {
highestSupportedVersion := supportedVersions[len(supportedVersions)-1]
lowestSupportedVersion := supportedVersions[0]
Expect(highestSupportedVersion).ToNot(Equal(lowestSupportedVersion))
cs.version = highestSupportedVersion
b := make([]byte, 4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b, uint32(lowestSupportedVersion))
fullCHLO[TagVER] = b
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.VersionNegotiationMismatch, "Downgrade attack detected")))
})
It("accepts a non-matching version tag in the CHLO, if it is an unsupported version", func() {
supportedVersion := protocol.SupportedVersions[0]
unsupportedVersion := supportedVersion + 1000
Expect(protocol.IsSupportedVersion(supportedVersions, unsupportedVersion)).To(BeFalse())
cs.version = supportedVersion
b := make([]byte, 4)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(b, uint32(unsupportedVersion))
fullCHLO[TagVER] = b
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
})
It("errors if the AEAD tag is missing", func() {
delete(fullCHLO, TagAEAD)
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.CryptoNoSupport, "Unsupported AEAD or KEXS")))
})
It("errors if the AEAD tag has the wrong value", func() {
fullCHLO[TagAEAD] = []byte("wrong")
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.CryptoNoSupport, "Unsupported AEAD or KEXS")))
})
It("errors if the KEXS tag is missing", func() {
delete(fullCHLO, TagKEXS)
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.CryptoNoSupport, "Unsupported AEAD or KEXS")))
})
It("errors if the KEXS tag has the wrong value", func() {
fullCHLO[TagKEXS] = []byte("wrong")
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagCHLO, Data: fullCHLO}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.Error(qerr.CryptoNoSupport, "Unsupported AEAD or KEXS")))
})
})
It("errors without SNI", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagSTK: validSTK,
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError("CryptoMessageParameterNotFound: SNI required"))
})
It("errors with empty SNI", func() {
HandshakeMessage{
Tag: TagCHLO,
Data: map[Tag][]byte{
TagSTK: validSTK,
TagSNI: nil,
},
}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError("CryptoMessageParameterNotFound: SNI required"))
})
It("errors with invalid message", func() {
stream.dataToRead.Write([]byte("invalid message"))
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.HandshakeFailed))
})
It("errors with non-CHLO message", func() {
HandshakeMessage{Tag: TagPAD, Data: nil}.Write(&stream.dataToRead)
err := cs.HandleCryptoStream()
Expect(err).To(MatchError(qerr.InvalidCryptoMessageType))
})
Context("escalating crypto", func() {
doCHLO := func() {
_, err := cs.handleCHLO("", []byte("chlo-data"), map[Tag][]byte{
TagPUBS: []byte("pubs-c"),
TagNONC: nonce32,
TagAEAD: aead,
TagKEXS: kexs,
})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(Receive()) // for the switch to secure
close(cs.sentSHLO)
}
Context("null encryption", func() {
It("is used initially", func() {
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(10), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar signed"))
enc, sealer := cs.GetSealer()
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted))
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 10, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar signed")))
})
It("is used for the crypto stream", func() {
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(0), []byte{})
enc, sealer := cs.GetSealerForCryptoStream()
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted))
sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 0, []byte{})
})
It("is accepted initially", func() {
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(5), []byte{}).Return([]byte("decrypted"), nil)
d, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), 5, []byte{})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("decrypted")))
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted))
})
It("errors if the has the wrong hash", func() {
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("not unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(5), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
_, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("not unencrypted"), 5, []byte{})
Expect(err).To(MatchError("authentication failed"))
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnspecified))
})
It("is still accepted after CHLO", func() {
doCHLO()
// it tries forward secure and secure decryption first
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(99), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(99), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(99), []byte{})
Expect(cs.secureAEAD).ToNot(BeNil())
_, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), 99, []byte{})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted))
})
It("is not accepted after receiving secure packet", func() {
doCHLO()
// first receive a secure packet
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(98), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(98), []byte{}).Return([]byte("decrypted"), nil)
d, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), 98, []byte{})
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionSecure))
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("decrypted")))
// now receive an unencrypted packet
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(99), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(99), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
_, enc, err = cs.Open(nil, []byte("unencrypted"), 99, []byte{})
Expect(err).To(MatchError("authentication failed"))
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnspecified))
})
It("is not used after CHLO", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(0), []byte{})
enc, sealer := cs.GetSealer()
Expect(enc).ToNot(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted))
sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 0, []byte{})
})
})
Context("initial encryption", func() {
It("is accepted after CHLO", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(98), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(98), []byte{}).Return([]byte("decrypted"), nil)
d, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), 98, []byte{})
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionSecure))
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("decrypted")))
})
It("is not accepted after receiving forward secure packet", func() {
doCHLO()
// receive a forward secure packet
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(11), []byte{})
_, _, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), 11, []byte{})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
// receive a secure packet
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(12), []byte{}).Return(nil, errors.New("authentication failed"))
_, enc, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("encrypted"), 12, []byte{})
Expect(err).To(MatchError("authentication failed"))
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionUnspecified))
})
It("is used for the crypto stream", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(1), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar crypto stream"))
enc, sealer := cs.GetSealerForCryptoStream()
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionSecure))
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 1, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar crypto stream")))
})
})
Context("forward secure encryption", func() {
It("is used after the CHLO", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(20), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar forward sec"))
enc, sealer := cs.GetSealer()
Expect(enc).To(Equal(protocol.EncryptionForwardSecure))
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 20, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar forward sec")))
})
It("regards the handshake as complete once it receives a forward encrypted packet", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(200), []byte{})
_, _, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), 200, []byte{})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(handshakeEvent).To(BeClosed())
})
})
Context("reporting the connection state", func() {
It("reports before the handshake completes", func() {
cs.sni = "server name"
state := cs.ConnectionState()
Expect(state.HandshakeComplete).To(BeFalse())
Expect(state.ServerName).To(Equal("server name"))
})
It("reports after the handshake completes", func() {
doCHLO()
// receive a forward secure packet
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), protocol.PacketNumber(11), []byte{})
_, _, err := cs.Open(nil, []byte("forward secure encrypted"), 11, []byte{})
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
state := cs.ConnectionState()
Expect(state.HandshakeComplete).To(BeTrue())
})
})
Context("forcing encryption levels", func() {
It("forces null encryption", func() {
cs.nullAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(11), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar unencrypted"))
sealer, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionUnencrypted)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 11, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar unencrypted")))
})
It("forces initial encryption", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.secureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(12), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar secure"))
sealer, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionSecure)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 12, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar secure")))
})
It("errors if no AEAD for initial encryption is available", func() {
sealer, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionSecure)
Expect(err).To(MatchError("CryptoSetupServer: no secureAEAD"))
Expect(sealer).To(BeNil())
})
It("forces forward-secure encryption", func() {
doCHLO()
cs.forwardSecureAEAD.(*mockcrypto.MockAEAD).EXPECT().Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), protocol.PacketNumber(13), []byte{}).Return([]byte("foobar forward sec"))
sealer, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionForwardSecure)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
d := sealer.Seal(nil, []byte("foobar"), 13, []byte{})
Expect(d).To(Equal([]byte("foobar forward sec")))
})
It("errors of no AEAD for forward-secure encryption is available", func() {
seal, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionForwardSecure)
Expect(err).To(MatchError("CryptoSetupServer: no forwardSecureAEAD"))
Expect(seal).To(BeNil())
})
It("errors if no encryption level is specified", func() {
seal, err := cs.GetSealerWithEncryptionLevel(protocol.EncryptionUnspecified)
Expect(err).To(MatchError("CryptoSetupServer: no encryption level specified"))
Expect(seal).To(BeNil())
})
})
})
Context("STK verification and creation", func() {
It("requires STK", func() {
sourceAddrValid = false
done, err := cs.handleMessage(
bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize),
map[Tag][]byte{
TagSNI: []byte("foo"),
TagVER: versionTag,
},
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(done).To(BeFalse())
Expect(stream.dataWritten.Bytes()).To(ContainSubstring(string(validSTK)))
Expect(cs.sni).To(Equal("foo"))
})
It("works with proper STK", func() {
sourceAddrValid = true
done, err := cs.handleMessage(
bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, protocol.MinClientHelloSize),
map[Tag][]byte{
TagSNI: []byte("foo"),
TagVER: versionTag,
},
)
Expect(err).ToNot(HaveOccurred())
Expect(done).To(BeFalse())
})
})
})