cadey/xesite
cadey
/
xesite
1
0
Fork 1
Code Issues Pull Requests 1 Projects Releases Wiki Activity

oops 

Signed-off-by: Christine Dodrill <me@christine.website>
This commit is contained in:
Cadey Ratio 2021-07-19 08:35:07 -04:00
parent d752cd91b1
commit 5f4db2e9c4
1 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
blog/paranoid-nixos-2021-07-18.markdown
View File

@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ At a high-level I'm assuming the following things about this setup:
- It should be annoying for attackers to get a user-level shell
- But ensure they'll be able to anyways if they're dedicated enough
- It should be difficult for attackers to run their own code on the system
- But ensure that it could happen and make evidence of that very loud
- It should be aggrivating for attackers to access the package manager on the
- But assume that it could happen and make evidence of that very loud
- It should be aggravating for attackers to access the package manager on the
system
- But ensure that they can't do anything very easily even if they can access the
package manager itself
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ service itself. This is for defense in _depth_, which means that you want to
make sure that things are reasonably secure even if an attacker manages to get
code execution on one of your services. These settings prevent the service's
view of the system from having too much detail, which can make the attacking
process more annoying. Remember that the he goal here isn't to make the system
process more annoying. Remember that the goal here isn't to make the system
attack-proof, nothing is. The goal is to annoy the attacker enough that they
give up. This is not perfect and probably will fall apart <a
href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf">if your enemy