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paranoid nixos post 

Signed-off-by: Christine Dodrill <me@christine.website>
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---
title: Paranoid NixOS Setup
date: 2021-07-18
author: ectamorphic
series: nixos
tags:
- paranoid
- noexec
---
Most of the time you can get away with a fairly simple security posture on
NixOS. Don't run services as root, separate each service into its own systemd
units, don't run packages you don't trust the heritage of and most importantly
don't give random people shell access with passwordless sudo.
Sometimes however, you have good reasons to want to lock everything down as much
as humanly possible. This could happen when you want to create production
servers for something security-critical such as a bastion host. In this post I'm
going to show you a defense-in-depth model for making a NixOS server that is a
bit more paranoid than usual, as well as explanations of all the moving parts.
## High-level Ideas
At a high-level I'm assuming the following things about this setup:
- It should be very difficult to get in as a passive attacker
- But the defense doesn't stop at "just hope they don't get in"
- It should be annoying for attackers to get a user-level shell
- But ensure they'll be able to anyways if they're dedicated enough
- It should be difficult for attackers to run their own code on the system
- But ensure that it could happen and make evidence of that very loud
- It should be aggrivating for attackers to access the package manager on the
system
- But ensure that they can't do anything very easily even if they can access the
package manager itself
Some additional goals:
- Make the system only manageable by a central management system such as morph
or nixops
- Only make SSH visible over a VPN of some kind, such as
[Tailscale](https://tailscale.com) or another WireGuard setup
- Mount the root filesystem on a tmpfs
- Have explicitly defined persistent folders
- Mark everything as `noexec` except for the mount that `/nix/store` is on
- Don't make the system too difficult to use in the process
[Disclaimer: I am a Tailscale employee. Tailscale did not review this
post for accuracy or content, though this setup is based on conversations I've
had with a coworker at Tailscale.](conversation://Cadey/enby)
Along the way we'll be making a system that I'm naming `meeka`. We'll put its
configuration in a folder named `meeka`:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/configuation.nix
{ ... }:
{
networking.hostName = "meeka";
services.openssh.enable = true;
}
```
## Low-hanging Fruit
There are some easy things we can get out of the way. One of the biggest ways
that people get in is to make services visible to attack in the first place.
### The Firewall
Let's get one of the lowest-hanging fruits out of the way: the firewall. Most of
the background radiation of the internet is in the form of automated probes to
development ports and SSH traffic. NixOS actually includes a firewall by
default! You can see more information on how to configure it
[here](https://nixos.org/manual/nixos/stable/index.html#sec-firewall), but
here's a good collection of values to use by default:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/firewall.nix
{ ... }:
{
networking.firewall.enable = true;
}
```
### VPN for Access
Generally, it's probably okay to use SSH over the unprotected internet for
accessing your machines. However, this is all about maximum paranoia, so we're
going to use a VPN to get into the machine. [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/)
is a fairly direct thing to set up in NixOS:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/tailscale.nix
{ ... }:
{
services.tailscale.enable = true;
# Tell the firewall to implicitly trust packets routed over Tailscale:
networking.firewall.trustedInterfaces = [ "tailscale0" ];
}
```
When you boot into the server, you can log in like normal using the `tailscale
up` command. You can probably isolate down the server using
[ACLs](https://tailscale.com/kb/1018/acls/) if you want to make sure things are
a bit more paranoid.
It may be good to set up a second way to get into the machine, just in case. I
personally try to leave at least 3 ways into my servers, but the super paranoid
production-facing servers should probably only be able to be connected to over a
VPN of some kind.
If you want to see more about how to set up WireGuard on NixOS, see
[here](https://christine.website/blog/my-wireguard-setup-2021-02-06) for more
information.
## Locking Down the Hatches
Now that we're getting out of the easy stuff, let's go to the more defense in
depth stuff. Here we're going to talk about separation of concerns and all those
other fun things.
### Each Service Gets its own User Account
I am going to use the word "service" annoyingly vague here. In this world, a
"service" is a human-oriented view of "computer does the thing I want it to do".
This website you're reading this post on could be one service, and it should
have a separate account from other services. See
[here](https://christine.website/blog/nixops-services-2020-11-09) for more
information on how to set this up.
### Lock Down Services Within Systemd
[systemd](https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/) is a suite of
tools that NixOS uses to manage a huge chunk of the system. It is kinda
complicated and very large in scope, however this also means that you get access
to a lot of convenient security management features. One of them is the
`Protect*` unit options in
[`systemd.exec(5)`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/systemd.exec.5.html),
which can be used to lock down permissions to the resource and system call
level. Let's cover some of my favorites that you can slipstream into services:
Also take a look at `systemd-analyze security yourservicename.service`, that
will give you a lot more things to search through the systemd documentation for.
#### `ProtectHome`/`ProtectSystem`
These options allow you to change how systemd presents critical system files and
`/home` to a given process. You can use this to remove the ability for a service
to modify system files or peek into user's home directories, even as root. This
allows you to put a lot more limits on a service's power.
#### `NoNewPrivileges`
If this is set, child processes of this service cannot gain more privileges
period. Even if the child process is a suid binary.
[A suid binary is a binary that has the suid flag set. This makes the Linux
kernel change the active user field of that binary to the owner of the binary
when you run it. This is a huge part of how the magic behind sudo and ping
works.](conversation://Mara/hacker)
#### `ProtectKernel{Logs,Modules,Tuneables}`
These ones are fairly simple so I'm gonna use some bullet trees for them:
- `ProtectKernelLogs`: If set to true, the service cannot access the kernel
message buffer that you get by running `dmesg` or reading from `/proc/kmsg`.
- `ProtectKernelModules`: If set to true, the service cannot load or unload
kernel modules.
- `ProtectKernelTunables`: If set to true, various twiddly bits in `/proc` and
`/sys` that let you control tunable values in the kernel will be made
read-only. Most of the time these values are set early in the system boot
process and never twiddled with again, so it's reasonable to deny a service
(and its child processes) access to these
[Why should I bother making all of these changes to my services though? Isn't it
overkill to have a webapp running as a service user get denied access to even
look at the kernel log?](conversation://Mara/hmm)
[To be honest, it can look like paranoid overkill, but this isn't just for the
service itself. This is for defense in _depth_, which means that you want to
make sure that things are reasonably secure even if an attacker manages to get
code execution on one of your services. These settings prevent the service's
view of the system from having too much detail, which can make the attacking
process more annoying. Remember that the he goal here isn't to make the system
attack-proof, nothing is. The goal is to annoy the attacker enough that they
give up. This is not perfect and probably will fall apart <a
href="https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf">if your enemy
is the Mossad</a>, but it's at least an attempt to lock things down just in case
the attackers aren't sending their "A" game. You may also want to look into
`InaccessiblePaths` to block away other folders that you deem "forbidden" as
facts and circumstances demand.](conversation://Cadey/enby)
### Lock Down Nix Access
Nix is the package manager for NixOS. Nix can be invoked by users. Nix lets
users access things like compilers and scripting languages. These can be used to
run exploit tools. This can be understandably problematic from a security
standpoint.
NixOS has an option called
[`nix.allowedUsers`](https://nixos.org/manual/nixos/stable/options.html#opt-nix.allowedUsers)
that lets you specify which users or groups are allowed to do anything with the
Nix daemon, and by extension the Nix package manager. For a fairly standard
setup, you can probably get away with the following which allows everyone that
can `sudo` to access the Nix daemon:
```nix
# configuration/meeka/nix.nix
{ ... }:
{
nix.allowedUsers = [ "@wheel" ];
}
```
However if you want to prevent everyone but root, you can use a configuration
like this:
```nix
# configuration/meeka/nix.nix
{ ... }:
{
nix.allowedUsers = [ "root" ];
}
```
You may also want to block access to the NixOS cache CDN with an external
firewall rule if you really don't trust things. You can block it by blocking the
fastly IP range `151.101.0.0/16`.
[I'd suggest doing this firewall change on the level above the NixOS machine
itself, just in case the machine gets owned and then they ditch your firewall
rules in an effort to aid in exfiltration.](conversation://Mara/hacker)
## Making the System Amnesiac
Most of these steps go way deep down the security rabbit hole. A lot of these
are focused on limiting access to persistent storage so that persistence is
opted into, not opted out of. These steps will essentially mount the root
filesystem on a tmpfs that is cleared out on every reboot, with persistent data
written to a subfolder in `/nix` that a symlink/bindmount farm is linked to.
Most of these steps will require you to reprovision your NixOS machines and may
require you to build your own custom images for cloud providers. Your experience
and mileage may vary.
These steps will be based on the excellent work done in these posts/projects:
- [impermanence](https://github.com/nix-community/impermanence)
- [NixOS ❄: tmpfs as root](https://elis.nu/blog/2020/05/nixos-tmpfs-as-root/)
- [Erase your darlings](https://grahamc.com/blog/erase-your-darlings)
### Partitioning/Setup
Normally the NixOS partition setup looks a bit like this:
- `/boot` for either BIOS boot or EFI files
- 2x ram for swap (swap is not a panacea, however it can sometimes give you
valuable time to debug a problem)
- `/` for everything else
[It's worth noting that technically NixOS works fine if you make only one big
filesystem and put `/boot` on there directly, but this may only pan out for BIOS
booting systems.](conversation://Mara/hacker)
Given that `/` is going to become an in-memory tmpfs, we can instead move the
partitioning to look like this:
- `/boot` for either BIOS boot or EFI files
- 2x ram for swap
- `/nix` for everything else
Assuming you are [installing NixOS from scratch in a VM to test this part
out](https://nixos.org/manual/nixos/stable/index.html#sec-installation), the
partitioning setup commands could look something like this:
```sh
dev=/dev/vda # replace me with the actual device
parted ${dev} -- mklabel msdos
parted ${dev} -- mkpart primary ext4 1M 512M
parted ${dev} -- set 1 boot on
parted ${dev} -- mkpart primary ext4 512MiB 100%
mkfs.ext4 -L boot ${dev}1
mkfs.ext4 -L nix ${dev}2
```
[Wait, ext4? I thought you were a zfs stan?](conversation://Mara/hmm)
[I normally am, however in this case it's probably better to keep the scary
production servers as boring and vanilla as possible, especially when doing a
more weird setup like this](conversation://Cadey/enby)
The exact size of your /boot partition may vary based on facts and
circumstances, however in practice I've found 512 MB to be a not-terrible
default.
Make your "root mount" with a tmpfs:
```sh
mount -t tmpfs none /mnt
```
Then you need to create the persistent folders on `/nix/persist`. I've found
these defaults to be not-horrible:
```sh
mkdir -p /mnt/{boot,nix,etc/{nixos,ssh},var/{lib,log},srv}
```
[We use `/srv` as the home for our services. Adjust this as your facts and
circumstances demand.](conversation://Mara/hacker)
Then mount those two partitions to your tmpfs:
```sh
mount ${dev}1 /mnt/boot
mount ${dev}2 /mnt/nix
```
And create matching folders in `/mnt/nix/persist`:
```sh
mkdir -p /mnt/nix/persist/{etc/{nixos,ssh},var/{lib,log},srv}
```
Then finally create some bind mounts to tie everything together for the
meantime. These bindmounts will be handled by impermanence in the future,
however for now the quick and dirty method will suffice:
```sh
mount -o bind /mnt/nix/persist/etc/nixos /mnt/etc/nixos
mount -o bind /mnt/nix/persist/var/log /mnt/var/log
```
Then generate a base config with `nixos-generate-config`:
```sh
nixos-generate-config --root /mnt
```
And open `/etc/nixos/hardware-configuration.nix` to edit the settings for the
tmpfs mount on `/`. At a high level you'll need to change this:
```nix
fileSystems."/" = {
device = "none";
fsType = "tmpfs";
options = [ "defaults" "mode=755" ];
};
```
to this:
```nix
fileSystems."/" = {
device = "none";
fsType = "tmpfs";
options = [ "defaults" "size=2G" "mode=755" ];
};
```
This will limit `/` to taking up 2 GB of storage at most. This will mostly
contain temporary files and the like, but you should adjust this as makes sense
given the amount of ram your systems have. I personally think that 512 MB could
make sense depending on what you are doing.
### Using Impermanence
Now we get to add [impermanence](https://github.com/nix-community/impermanence)
to the mix to handle making all of those pesky bind mounts for us on boot. One
of the easiest ways you can add its module to the nix search path is to set the
`NIX_PATH` environment variable like this:
```sh
export NIX_PATH=nixpkgs=channel:nixos-21.05:impermanence=https://github.com/nix-community/impermanence/archive/refs/heads/master.tar.gz:nixos-config=/etc/nixos/configuration.nix
```
This will set the import path `<impermanence>` to point to the git repository
for impermanence. Depending on your security needs you may want to mirror the
impermanence git repo, but keep in mind it needs to point to a tarball for Nix
to understand what to do with it.
Once you have that added, you can add the impermanence configuration to your
`/etc/nixos/configuration.nix`:
```nix
environment.persistence."/nix/persist" = {
directories = [
"/etc/nixos" # nixos system config files, can be considered optional
"/srv" # service data
"/var/lib" # system service persistent data
"/var/log" # the place that journald dumps it logs to
];
};
```
Finally you'll want to set these configuration lines for files in `/etc/sshd`.
I've tried doing it directly in `environment.persistence.<name>.directories`
directly but it seems to make `sshd.service` unable to generate its host keys,
which is slightly important for sshd to work at all. These lines will point the
files to the right places:
```nix
environment.etc."ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key".source
= "/nix/persist/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key";
environment.etc."ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub".source
= "/nix/persist/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub";
environment.etc."ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key".source
= "/nix/persist/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key";
environment.etc."ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub".source
= "/nix/persist/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub";
```
The machine ID may be important too if you want to read logs locally after you
reboot, or if you have any services that expect the machine ID to not change.
```nix
environment.etc."machine-id".source
= "/nix/persist/etc/machine-id";
```
From here you can continue with `nixos-install` like normal (though you may want
to add `--no-root-passwd` if you added a default root password to your config
for bootstrap reasons only). However if you want to be lazy you can read below
where I show you how to automatically create an ISO that does all this for you.
### Repeatable Base Image with an ISO
Using the setup I mentioned [in a past
post](https://christine.website/blog/my-homelab-2021-06-08), you can create an
automatic install ISO that will take a blank disk to a state where you can SSH
into it and configure it further using a tool like
[morph](https://github.com/DBCDK/morph). Take a look at [this
folder](https://github.com/Xe/nixos-configs/tree/master/media/autoinstall-paranoid)
in my nixos-configs repo for more information. Most of the magic is done with
the `build` script. It's basically the last few sections of this article turned
into nix files. If you build it yourself you'll want to take care with the line
that looks like this:
```nix
users.users.root.initialPassword = "hunter2";
users.users.root.openssh.authorizedKeys.keyFiles = [ (fetchKeys "Xe") ];
```
This sets the root password to `hunter2` (a reasonably secure default for
bootstrapping systems only, holy crap do not use this in production) so you can
log in with the console and the list of SSH keys from
[here](https://github.com/Xe.keys). Replace `Xe` with your GitHub username. This
is not the most deterministic, but if GitHub is down you probably have bigger
problems. It's also a decent crutch to help you bootstrap things. If this
bothers you you can set authorized keys as normal:
```nix
users.users.root.openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
"ssh-yolo swag420blazeit"
];
```
You can turn this into an EC2 image with something like
[packer](https://www.packer.io/).
## Audit Tracing
The Linux kernel has some fancy auditing powers that are criminally under-used.
[Isn't that because the audit subsystem has the ergonomics of driving a
submarine down a road?](conversation://Mara/happy)
Well, yes but until I learn how to summon the right kinds of daemons, I can
start with this audit rule to log every single time a program is attempted to be
run:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/auditd.nix
{ ... }:
{
security.auditd.enable = true;
security.audit.enable = true;
security.audit.rules = [
"-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S execve"
];
}
```
You can monitor these logs with `journalctl -f`. If you don't see any audit logs
show up, ssh in from another window and run some commands like `ls`. You should
see a flurry of them show up.
### Send All Logs Off-Machine
You should really treat all system-local logs as radioactive. They are
liabilities and in some cases can present problematic situations when faced with
questionable interpretations of things like the GDPR. Not to mention attackers
will be tempted to wipe all record of their attacks from them. I don't really
have a suggestion for the best practice here, but I'm sure that people smarter
than me have come up with good suggestions in my place. Either way, get them off
the system as fast as possible.
You should probably have some process scraping the audit logs to check for
programs outside of `/nix/store` being executed. That can sometimes point to
signs of a break-in.
[Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?](conversation://Numa/delet)
## Optional Steps
Normally a lot of these suggestions are aimed at not totally interfering with
normal usability so that in case you need to debug things you can do so with
surgical precision. However, depending on your level of paranoia you may want to
go a step further and disable some things that most may consider to be a "core
part of basic usability". Just be aware that these things may make debugging an
errant system difficult.
### Rip Out `sudo`
[sudo](https://www.sudo.ws/) is a commonly used tool that allows users to assume
superuser powers for a short amount of time. The things they do with `sudo` are
logged to the system, but this project has been known to occasionally have
security issues.
[Isn't that because it's written in C and C is inherently unsafe even though
hordes of "experts" decry otherwise?](conversation://Mara/hmm)
[Don't say that, you'll incite the horde.](conversation://Cadey/facepalm)
NixOS lets us rip that out if we want to:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/sudo.nix
{ ... }:
{
security.sudo.enable = false;
}
```
If you want to keep it around but instead limit its use to users that are in the
`wheel` group, you can instead opt for something like this:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/sudo.nix
{ ... }:
{
security.sudo.execWheelOnly = true;
}
```
### Rip Out Default Packages
By default NixOS comes with a few packages like nano, perl and rsync to help you
get started using it. These are great and all, but can be slightly incredibly
problematic from a security standpoint. Rip them out like this:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/no-defaults.nix
{ lib, ... }:
{
environment.defaultPackages = lib.mkForce [];
}
```
[The `lib.mkForce` function forcibly overrides the contents of that value to
what you give as an argument. This is useful for saying "no, heck you, I want it
to be set to this no matter what anyone else says". This can be a useful hammer
when correcting the security model of NixOS services when you have a good reason
to.](conversation://Mara/hacker)
### Disable sshd Features
sshd is great. You can use it to log into systems, proxy traffic and more. sshd
is also horrible because you can proxy traffic and more, turning a machine into
an unexpected jumpbox for attackers. This is not ideal for machines that you
don't expect to be jumpboxes. Disable this feature and some more (such as X11
forwarding, SSH agent forwarding and stream-local forwarding) like this:
```nix
# configuration/meeka/sshd.nix
{ ... }:
{
services.openssh = {
passwordAuthentication = false;
allowSFTP = false; # Don't set this if you need sftp
challengeResponseAuthentication = false;
extraConfig = ''
AllowTcpForwarding yes
X11Forwarding no
AllowAgentForwarding no
AllowStreamLocalForwarding no
AuthenticationMethods publickey
'';
};
}
```
### Mark All Partitions but `/nix/store` as `noexec`
This is the most paranoid of the ideas in this post. The idea is that if you
lock down the package manager so random services can't install software and you
also make it impossible for them to write and run executable files outside of
`/nix/store`, it becomes very difficult to exploit kernel bugs to get root. Add
this with the other systemd isolation features that disable access to device
nodes and twiddly system flags and you have a defense in depth setup that will
make an attacker's life hard. They will have to get code execution in your
services to do any damage.
Keep in mind that doing this will likely break the heck out of Nix when it needs
to build things. In my testing it's been fine, however I am not an expert in
these things. Something else to keep in mind is that you should configure your
services to be denied access to `/nix/persist` and instead only allow them
access to individual paths in the bind mounts on `/`, just in case they do that
to try and sneak an executable through. This will not stop them from making a
shell script and running it with `bash ./foo.sh`, but it will make it annoying
to run things like C executables, which is much more important in this case.
For this you can set the following NixOS options:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/noexec.nix
{ ... }:
{
fileSystems."/".options = [ "noexec" ];
fileSystems."/etc/nixos".options = [ "noexec" ];
fileSystems."/srv".options = [ "noexec" ];
fileSystems."/var/log".options = [ "noexec" ];
}
```
This will make `/nix/store` (or symlinks to files in `/nix/store`) the only
binaries that are allowed to be executed. This is a rather extreme step, but it
should fairly sufficiently prevent any attacker from getting very far with
exploits written in languages like C (which also means that it prevents bitcoin
miner bots from running).
## PCI Compliance Tip
PCI Compliance requires you to have an antivirus program installed on every
server. It doesn't say anything about the program _running_, but just it being
installed is enough. Get one step closer to PCI compliance with this one neat
trick:
```nix
# hosts/meeka/pci-compliance-pass.nix
{ pkgs, ... }:
{
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [ clamav ];
}
```
[...doesn't that defeat the spirit of the thing?](conversation://Mara/hmm)
[To be honest, if you get to the end of those post and have an "all yes config"
of this setup, installing an antivirus program to satisfy requirements that were
primarily written for windows servers is probably one of the easiest steps you
can take.](conversation://Cadey/coffee)
---
All in all, this entire setup will let you get a rather paranoid configuration
that will reject everything outside of the golden path of what you told the
machines to do. It will take some work to get to here (as well as being willing
to experiment with a few virtual machines to test this process a few times
before feeling safe enough to put this into production), but the end result
should be a decently secure setup.
Obligatory warning: don't put this directly into production unless you know what
you are doing, or at least can claim you know what you are doing with enough
certainty to make servers difficult to debug. Have a way to "break the glass"
and go back to a less noexec setup if you need to, it will save your ass.
[Oh, also be sure to import all of those random `.nix` files if you want to use
it in one cohesive system config. That may be a slight bit entirely essential.
^\_^](conversation://Mara/hacker)