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264 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
264 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: The Surreal Horror of PAM
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date: 2021-11-09
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slides_link: /static/talks/surreal-horror-pam.pdf
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tags:
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- alpinelinux
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- pam
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- satire
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---
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<iframe width="1043" height="587" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/INjCiHUIjgg" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
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[https://youtu.be/INjCiHUIjgg](https://youtu.be/INjCiHUIjgg)
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---
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Hi, I’m Xe. You know this because that is what your computer tells you. But how
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does it know that?
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This is a partially satirical talk. It is intended to be mostly factually
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accurate, however some of the details are stretched for comedic effect. This
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talk may contain opinions, none of these opinions are the opinions of my
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employer. I hope you enjoy this catharsis.
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You may want to make sure you all are muted, as this is probably going to make
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you laugh and I’ll get speech jammed if I hear it. I’m also planning on
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publishing this publicly, so please avoid mentioning privileged information in
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the Q&A section at the end.
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So before we talk about complicated things, let’s start with the basics. This is
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how UNIX systems authenticate. They have some files in /etc/ that are
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effectively plaintext databases for usernames, ids, groups and password hashes,
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and those are what are used for this legacy authentication flow.
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You start with a login program running as root (such as /bin/login) and then it
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gets your username and password. Then it checks /etc/passwd to see if your user
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account exists. If it does it grabs the user ID and uses that to look up more
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information from /etc/groups to build up your dossier. Then it takes your
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password and does some crazy math to it to compare it to the hashed password in
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/etc/shadow. If it matches (or if someone forces it to match through malicious
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means), then the login program forks a child process, impersonates your user
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account based on that dossier from earlier, creates a login shell and finally
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sends you off to do whatever it is you want to the poor computer.
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That’s it. That’s how the classic System V authentication stack works.
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Technically I’m stretching things a bit as /etc/shadow was a fairly recent
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addition (mostly because /etc/passwd is world-readable by design for some arcane
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reason that I can’t find on Google), but it’s basically that. There’s a few
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steps I’m leaving out for brevity, but they are boring things that only nerds
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care about.
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This UNIX authentication model is really that simple. You can explain the high
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level details on a single slide that was hastily written at 8 am in about 5
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minutes. However, because of this simplicity it leaves attackers with a small
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list of targets to try to trick the computer into mucking with. But it does
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work, mostly.
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Some of the huge downsides are that it only works on one machine at the time.
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This made sense for when UNIX was created as the model was to have a big ol
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mainframe for a company and then have everyone connect to it, but in the
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meantime we’ve gone around carrying supercomputers in our watches and always
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having a calculator in our pockets (Miss Van Hamme, you should have been more
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forward thinking than to insinuate otherwise in my second grade math class!).
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Because of this (and the fact that said supercomputer watches also run a full
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fledged UNIX kernel), we can’t really rely on a model created for 1970’s
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mainframe technology to get the job done in this day and age of hyperconverged
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cloud federated femtoservices.
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The last sentence probably set off the beard twitching alarms, so yes there are
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some workarounds here.
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You could JUST put the files on a network filesystem. That would make them
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immutable to whoever tries to mess with them on an individual machine. However
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the peak of network filesystem security on Linux is “don’t get your network
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hacked lol”. They won’t add the ability for a kernel mode filesystem driver to
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make TLS validated sessions so you can use this thing called cryptography to
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secure access to the filesystem and data on the wire. They are busy arguing with
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people about how to send plain-text email and the like. You could also put those
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files on a CD, set the immutable flag or something, but all that will do is
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making changing passwords more expensive, annoying and filled with anger.
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What’s that? I think I hear something coming.
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It’s sshd! Turns out that we do in fact need something more complicated because
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we have networks and the cloud and complicated mutifactor auth requirements for
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acronym compliance! We can’t really do that with UNIX authentication because it
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was designed before such things were even a glimmer in the eye of security
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professionals.
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Surely there has to be a better option out there _somewhere_.
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Et voila! C’est le PAM! Turns out someone else a long time ago had the same
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problems and somehow got legal to sign off on making it open source! PAM is a
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modular system for making authentication and authorization work.
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For reference, authentication and authorization are being split up into two
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concepts here (like they are in a lot of the industry). We’re gonna take a page
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out of the white hat’s guide to security here and call these concepts
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authentication (who you are and how we know who you are) and authorization (can
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you _really_ take all the money out of the bank account?). It is a solid 90’s
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solution to a 70’s problem and good god it shows.
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PAM was made in the 90’s by this little startup nobody here has heard of called
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Sun Microsystems. They had a problem where they had a bunch of machines to apply
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complicated authentication rules to (all thanks to those pesky enterprise
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contracts) and no way to really do it. Money won this valiant fight between
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engineering and sales, so we ended up with PAM.
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So you’re probably wondering something along the lines of “how does this thing
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work?”. Carefully, that's how.
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This is a screenshot of a text file (a common thing to do these days) of the
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main PAM configuration file in a distribution called Alpine Linux. I’m using
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Alpine Linux here because it is the simpler option for getting PAM to work and I
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really do not want to spend all day debugging PAM with gdb and strace on Ubuntu
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to demonstrate it with that. PAM has a few kinds of modules:
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* authentication, this is not just checking your password, but also making sure
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that your account is allowed to be logged into and setting up things like your
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preferred login shell
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* account, the things that assign a user an account based on the circumstances
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of their authentication or validate that somehow (this is also where an LDAP
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server would get thrown into the mix if you really hate yourself)
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* password, the things that check passwords or do other kinds of validation like
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that (if you want to use Google Authenticator TOTP codes, you’d do that here)
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* session, these things handle other system errata like making sure the
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message-of-the-day (MOTD) is shown when you log in or letting logind know
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about the session so it can make a cgroup for you
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All of these modules are implemented as dynamically linked libraries in C (the
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HEIGHT of modern programming security, as we all know) and PAM works by loading
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all of these files out of /lib/security, throwing them directly into ram and
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then executing arbitrary C ABI functions out of them to see what they return.
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Yes, really. I am still surprised that the modules are written in C and not Java
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given it was from Sun.
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If you typo this configuration file and don’t have a root session open with your
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box, it is even worse than typoing the /etc/sudoers file. Typoing /etc/sudoers
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will just make it impossible to use sudo. Your system can limp along in the
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meantime or you can directly login as root or something to mend the situation,
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but typoing the PAM file will cause glibc to hold your wife and children hostage
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until you forcibly reboot the system and hack back into it so you can regain
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control.
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How is this relevant to us? Well, I have a bit of a side project going on. I’ve
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been trying to write a PAM module that would use Tailscale as its authentication
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method.
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When you are on a Tailscale network, you are already past a two-factor auth
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trust barrier. If we know who you are, and you are authorized to connect to the
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server by its ACLs, why should we subject you to the surreal horror of local
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authentication logic in order to let you SSH into the server? We know who you
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are. You’re allowed to connect to it, so why stop you?
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The heart of the PAM module I’ve been writing looks like this right now. It sets
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up syslog for its log sink (this is really your only good option in PAM land)
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with a syslog client, grabs the status of the network from tailscaled, and
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finally makes sure that the IP address is in the tailnet. This probably should
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be more complicated in the future, I’ve had ideas for sending a TSMP message to
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the source machine to prompt you with a “are you sure you want to do that” style
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message, but they are just ideas right now. But yes, the rest is a bunch of
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random boilerplate code to deal with PAM’s complexities, making sure that the C
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ABI functions are exposed correctly and other helpers to grab things from
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tailscaled with unix sockets.
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This is written in Rust because I personally believe that writing security
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critical components that we would ship with the operating system in C is a
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massive disservice to our users. Go also doesn’t really have a good story to do
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interoperability with core C system components like this (the Go runtime is
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_massive_ and as of writing this post the entire PAM module I’ve written is
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smaller than the Go runtime, even with a statically compiled copy of libcurl).
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Plus I also get to use this to point out the little question mark at the end of
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the third line of this code blurb. See that question mark? It is an “if err !=
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nil, return nil, err” statement. It’s handled at compile time and it will even
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return the Ok side of the result if there is one. God I understand why Go can’t
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have that nice thing but it would take at least 7 lines of code out of my
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keyboard firmware if we had that nice thing in Go (not to mention countless
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editor macros for other people).
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If you want to peek around the C module part of the PAM project, the QR code
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will take you there.
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I’m fairly sure that I can get away with this (I made my appropriate sacrifices
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to the demo gods this morning), so let’s try SSHing into a VM on my laptop. If
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you are watching the recording of this talk or you are not in the corp tailnet,
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that command will not work. However you should see something like this:
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It would be really cool to flesh this out as a full product. I feel this could
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really make people’s lives a lot easier. The hard part is going to be making
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sure that this absolutely has security experts pour over this to make sure that
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this is _actually_ safe. I’m fairly sure that it is safe as it is, but right now
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this is an uberhammer that lets you log in as root if you get SSH access to a
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system. I would love to have this send a TSMP message to have a GUI prompt
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validate that you want to do this as a kind of second factor for authentication,
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but even in this limited state I feel it has a lot of value as is.
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Something you may wonder (and something I had to wonder too) is how do you debug
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PAM?
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It ain’t easy. I’m currently trying to get this thing to work on Ubuntu and all
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of the paths I have taken are fraught with despair. I have luckily not managed
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to lock myself out of the system yet, but it is really fighting me. You know
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you’re in for a ride when obscure PDFs of ring-binder manuals that have been
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poorly maintained tell you to do things that literally do not exist anymore.
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I’ve had to use a combination of a debugger and a system call tracing tool to
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get anywhere with it. PAM is a surreal horror because the most terrifying part
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is that it works and that there’s not really any good other options.
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This is not OpenBSD or Plan 9. This is Linux and macOS. Those exist but we can’t
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use them because we are cursed into using PAM. Especially so if we want to do
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this on arbitrary customer machines.
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That’s the end of the talk! I want to give special thanks to the council of
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elders that I summoned the help of in order to get this far. Without their help
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(and at least 800 bing points worth of searching) I would have never been able
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to understand this at all. If you have any questions, you can ask them now; just
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remember that you probably are still on mute.
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---
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As a note to people who are reading: if you want my wit, charm and/or smarmy
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style to grace your conference of choice, please [get in contact with
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me](/contact) and I'll see what I can do to make it happen.
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